To consider ourselves as "lesser evil" and to consider ourselves "holier" are two different categories in evaluating moral action, that its motivation and success rate vary in each other. After reviewing the justification mechanisms in four real situations involving altruistic act, the present study seeks to examine the validity of the current models of the temporality of justification for moral disengagement in terms of inclusion. In addition to verify the common models for categorizing justifications in two situations as "less evil" and as "holier", this examination aims to clarify the moral behaviors of the moral actor and facilitate ethical judgment in a more analytical space. The participants of the study were 71 undergraduate and postgraduate students at Shiraz University selected in convenience method. In order to evaluate how respondents respond to situations which require altruistic action, four realistic situations of altruistic action were designed. The responses and justifications presented by those who didn’t cooperate with the altruistic plan were subjected to direct content analysis. In the face of the altruistic plans of those who refuse, their justifications were in accordance with some of the mechanisms mentioned in the background. However, there were two categories of justification that were not understandable with the categories in the literature. These two categories are named according to their core themes, self-oriented justification, and other-oriented justification. The results implied confirmation of Klein and Epleis’s distinction of motivation toward lesser evil and holier.
