Showing 3 results for Criterion
Hadi Sadeghi, Mahdi Nosratian Ahoor,
Volume 6, Issue 1 (4-2013)
Abstract
Though there are different definitions for the word “mawt” (death), it seems that the most appropriate one would be the loss of power of the soul over the body, and that is when the soul is separated from the body. There are a variety of religious rulings for a human’s death in Islamic moral jurisprudence, and therefore it is necessary for a jurisprudent to have proper knowledge of the subject, reality, and the criterion for death and life. There are two main theories on the criterion for death and life from jurisprudential and moral perspectives. Some hold that everyone dies of cardiac arrest and others argue that man dies of brain death. It is also necessary to view the arguments presented by each group from jurisprudential and moral perspectives.
Advocates of the theory of cardiac arrest support their view through the following reasons: authority of established practice in concept analysis, incumbency of guarding the protected soul, principle of caution regarding people’s lives, and principle of istishab. Authors of the present paper have attempted to provide a critical analysis of the above-mentioned arguments in this study.
Advocates of the theory of brain death hold their view through the following reasons: the fetal heartbeat before the soul is breathed into it, possibility of cardiac transplantation and impossibility of brain transplantation, similarity between death and sleep, and signs and symptoms of death, among which two have been accepted: a) possibility of cardiac transplantation and impossibility of brain transplantation and b) signs and symptoms of death.
Seyed Abdolsaleh Jafarey, Behin Araminia, Ahmad Fayaz-Bakhsh,
Volume 7, Issue 6 (3-2015)
Abstract
The criteria for human dignity are among the most important topics associated with the concept. Some related questions are what makes man worthy of dignity, and what properties make him more dignified than other creatures? Although biological classifications of species should be considered in humanities, research on dignity must focus on differences that are fundamental and separate humans from all other species. Morphological, genetic and communal differences cannot be the criteria for dignity, and behaviors are subject to individual outlooks. This manner of reasoning guided scholars to categorize humans on the basis of wisdom, but the author of the present article believes that wisdom cannot be the criterion for dignity. There is a degree of intelligence and wisdom in other creatures that is not sufficient to make a fundamental differentiating factor. Like other faculties, wisdom may be regarded as an instrument for a better life. The authors believes that the “authority” to choose (that is, free will) is the essential difference between humans and other creatures because the latter are driven only by their structures or needs. This authority enables people to choose between good and bad or desirable and undesirable, and shapes most human values. Consequently, this authority creates the basis for dignity and any given type of choice passes its value on to the chooser.
Mohammad Rasekh, Faezeh Ameri,
Volume 15, Issue 1 (3-2022)
Abstract
Filiation is one of the important legal issues which has gone under developments during the history of legal system. Over the modern times, along with the emergence of new methods of reproduction particularly those with the help of a third party, legal regulation of filiation of children resulting from such methods has encountered with new challenges. To whom these children are to be filiated? According to one of the traditions, the mother filiation is based on gestation and the father’s one on gamete. The question, however, is that whether these two criteria can regulate the filiation of such children in a consistent and effective manner. A study of laws and regulations of various countries gives us a negative answer. Laws that merely rely on these two criteria for the determination of filiation of those children would give rise to vagueness, undecidedness and uncertainty in this regard. Therefore, the necessity of a new criterion, i.e. that of intention, has been put forth. In this paper, we intend to study efforts made by legislators and judges of different legal systems so as to reach an effective and consistent criterion in this area.
